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RETHINKING THE EMERGENCY-ROOM SURPRISE BILLING 
CRISIS: WHY ARE PATIENTS LIABLE FOR EMERGENCY CARE 
THEY DO NOT SEEK?  
Elliot S. Rosenwald* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Emergency patients who receive unrequested and unconsented care can 
be held liable for the entire cost of their medical bills under the common 
law doctrine of restitution. This Note analyzes the problem faced by these 
unlucky emergency patients in the American healthcare system billed for 
exorbitant sums. Rosenwald argues the statutory fixes recently enacted in 
some states are an important stating point, but they are ultimately 
insufficient. Reform is needed to better effectuate our sense of fairness and 
increase transparency within the healthcare market. Rosenwald encourages 
legislatures and the judiciary to reexamine the scope of the emergency 
exception in the restitution doctrine to reflect the numerous uncertainties 
inherent in emergency healthcare.  
 
*   J.D. (2020), Washington University in St. Louis. I am grateful to the editors of this volume for 
their hard work and helpful suggestions, all while adjusting to these disorienting times. Any mistakes, 
of course, are mine alone. I dedicate this note to Megan, whose everlasting love, wisdom, wit, and 
determination have made this note, and much else, possible. 



















Imagine you experience a freak accident. One of your hobbies, perhaps 
bike riding, suddenly goes awry. Your arm is mangled beyond recognition 
and you are rushed to a hospital hoping it can be saved. Though you get 
some pain medication in the ambulance, at the hospital you desperately need 
more. As the medical team takes stock of your injuries, they give you 
additional doses for your pain and begin to consider next steps.  
The medical team assesses that your injuries are beyond their skillset, 
and they need to transfer you to the specialty trauma center a hundred miles 
away. As the morphine kicks in, you hear them discussing the use of a 
medical helicopter to get you there. Perhaps aware of the scientific literature 
critical of the cost-benefit proposition of medical helicopter transports,1 you 
manage to inquire, despite your pain and the effects of the medication, 
regarding the cost of such an arrangement. Maybe you want to engage in a 
discussion about its pros and cons, as you would whenever you consider the 
benefits of a service before agreeing to pay for it. Unfortunately, the pain 
medication puts you over oblivion’s edge before you receive an answer. 
Imagine you wake up a few days later recovering from surgery at the 
trauma center. Though they were unable to save your arm, you are grateful 
that they saved your life, and you are excited to return home to continue the 
healing process. Your recovery progresses reassuringly well for a few 
months. And then a bill comes. It turns out that you were in fact transported 
by helicopter, and your insurance refuses to pay because the air ambulance 
service isn’t in their network. By law, you are liable for every last penny. 
The bill exceeds $56,000.  
For people like Naveed Kahn, this startling series of events is far from 
imaginary. In November 2017, Dr. Kahn experienced an A.T.V. accident, 
the outcome of which was a series of events much like that described 
above.2 As such experiences make plain, the technological marvel of 
modern emergency medicine—the lifesaving drugs and procedures 
administered by impeccably trained professionals—comes with a cost: bills 
 
1.   See Greg M. Borst et al., When Birds Can’t Fly: An Analysis of Interfacility Ground Transport 
Using Advanced Life Support when Helicopter Emergency Medical Service is Unavailable, 77 J. 
TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE SURGERY 331, 335 (2014). 
2.   See Alison Kodjak, Taken for a Ride: After ATV Crash, Doctor Gets $56,603 Bill for Air 



















that can ensnare patients in a financial abyss just as they are escaping from 
the medical precipice. While the problem of runaway patient-care costs 
seemingly knows no bounds in American health care,3 it is particularly 
pernicious in the context of emergencies like Dr. Khan’s, where a patient is 
physically unable to participate in medical decision-making.4 In such 
situations, of course, a patient is physically unable to form a contract for his 
care.5 How, then, can he be liable for it? 
This fundamental question underscores how financial liability for 
emergency care is uniquely situated within the broader set of issues 
regarding health care billing. In addressing this topic in particular, this note 
highlights the unique legal rationale under which patients can be held liable 
for the cost of care that they did not request, and to which they did not 
consent. It is not contract law, but the separate common-law doctrine of 
restitution that forms the legal underpinning for patient liability for 
emergency care. Moreover, atop this foundation, a thicket of often well-
meaning but frequently ineffectual or detrimental legislation amplifies the 
concrete implications of this theoretical problem for countless Americans. 
This note argues that, while statutory fixes like those enacted recently in 
some states are important starting points for controlling this crisis, they are 
ultimately insufficient because they fail to remedy the underlying 
incoherence of using an old-fashioned legal rationale—developed 
generations before modern health-care regulation—to make a minority of 
spectacularly unlucky patients liable for thousands of dollars of care that 
 
3.   See LIZ HAMEL ET AL., THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 26 (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2016 
https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/8806-the-burden-of-medical-debt-results-from-the-
kaiser-family-foundation-new-york-times-medical-bills-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZK7-GFN5] 
(“[P]roblems related to unaffordable medical bills and medical debt are prevalent . . . [including among 
people] who have higher incomes, who are insured, or who are otherwise in good health . . . ”). 
4.   Except where specified otherwise, this note uses the term emergency to refer to an unforeseen 
situation causing a patient to become unable to participate in decision-making due to diminished 
decisional or communicative capacity; it thus excludes some situations that would usually be considered 
medical emergencies but that do not interrupt a patient’s ability to make and communicate decisions 
(e.g., chest pain). See generally James Li et al., The “Prudent Layperson” Definition of an Emergency 
Medical Condition, 20 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 10 (2002). 
5.   Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical Consumers, 96 
GEO. L.J. 583, 595 (2008). This note does not address situations of post-rescue ratification, in which an 
individual’s subsequent promise to compensate a provider of lifesaving care creates a contract despite 
the arguable absence of consideration. See Ross A. Albert, Comment, Restitutionary Recovery for 
Rescuers of Human Life, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 85, 94-95 (1986) (citing Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 
(Ala. Ct. App. 1935)).  

















they did not seek. 
To reach this conclusion, this note proceeds as follows. Following this 
introduction, Part I provides background on the law of restitution and its 
emergency exception. Part II addresses the practical issues that arise from 
the theoretical background discussed in Part I, exploring how modern 
insurance and regulatory frameworks associated with emergency medical 
care can result in problematic liability for recipients of emergency care, and 
highlighting potential solutions. Part III then analyzes these potential 
solutions, identifies their successes and deficiencies, and recommends 
features that would improve future legislation.  
 
I.  RESTITUTION AS A BASIS FOR HEALTH CARE BILLING 
 
A.  Overview of Restitution 
 
I.  Common Law Origins 
 
Recent legal scholarship regarding the root causes of exorbitant patient 
liability in the American health care system has begun to recognize the 
relevance of underlying common-law doctrines, despite the amalgamation 
of mounds of federal and state regulation on top of the common law in 
recent decades. An early wave of this scholarship focused on tort law,6 while 
a more recent wave focuses on contract law.7 The focus on tort law is 
unsurprising because common sources of patient dissatisfaction, such as 
malpractice, are chiefly handled through the tort system.8 As to the billing 
side of patient concerns, contract law is of great relevance because health 
care, like other consumer services, is usually delivered in circumstances 
where “patients can turn down unnecessary care or seek lower priced care,” 
consistent with the free-market ideal that “patients [should] shoulder more 
 
6.  See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521 (1987); Note, “Common Sense” Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1765 (1996). 
7.  Two recent examples are Wendy Netter Epstein, Price Transparency and Incomplete 
Contracts in Health Care, 67 EMORY L.J. 1 (2017), which provides a robust assessment of the contract 
law implications of—and solutions to—the dearth of price transparency in many health care transactions, 
and Daryl M. Berke, Note, Drive-by-Doctoring: Contractual Issues and Regulatory Solutions to 
Increase Patient Protection from Surprise Medical Bills, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 170 (2016), which 
addresses the problem of physicians billing patients for care beyond what was contracted for.  


















of the economic burden of their health-care decisions . . . in hopes that [this] 
will prompt patients to act more like traditional consumers.”9  
Because of the emergency patient’s physical inability to engage in a 
bargain regarding her care, traditional contract principles are generally 
inapplicable in this context.10 These instances instead fall under the 
common-law doctrine of restitution,11 which, although often given the 
appellation “quasi-contract,”12 is a body of law entirely distinct from 
contract law.13 The law of restitution is known for its opacity,14 which, in 
addition to the rarity of true cases of nonbargained emergency care,15 may 
contribute to its being overlooked as a factor in health care billing. To help 
cut through the confusion, a convenient place to begin an explanation of 
restitution is by delineating what it is not.  
Though also frequently described as “quasi-contract” or “unjust 
enrichment,”16 these terms can be misleading because restitutionary liability 
requires neither a prior agreement nor fault on the part of the liable party.17 
 
9.  Epstein, supra note 7, at 3-4. 
10.  Id. at 52. 
11.  Hall, supra note 5. 
12.   See Epstein, supra note 7, at 52. 
13.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
14.   For example, a federal court recently found the doctrine so opaque as to render it 
“understandable” that a “[p]laintiff . . . conflate[d] several equitable doctrines,” none of which amounted 
to the plaintiff’s intended restitution claim. Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Blass, 882 F. Supp. 2d 
371, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). See also Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 
1195 n.15 (citing United States v. Consol. Edison Co., 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978), as an example of 
a case where a “distinguished panel” of circuit judges misapplied principles of restitution, displaying 
insufficient “comfort[] with the basic propositions of the Restatement of Restitution”).  
15.   See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL 
HOSPITAL AMBULATORY MEDICAL CARE SURVEY: 2015 EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT SUMMARY 
TABLES TABLE 5, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhamcs/web_tables/2015_ed_web_tables.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9AG7-X3VB] (reporting that only eight percent of patients are categorized in either of 
the two most severe triage categories at time of arrival to emergency department). 
16.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“[M]ost of the law of restitution might more helpfully be called the law of unjust or 
unjustified enrichment . . . while the name ‘restitution’ invites misunderstanding, it remains the word 
most commonly employed[.]”); Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary 
Common Law Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007) (identifying at least six names for the 
doctrine).  
17.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2011) (“Restitution is the law of nonconsensual and nonbargained benefits in the same way that torts is 
the law of nonconsensual and nonlicensed harms. Both subjects deal with the consequences of 
transactions in which the parties have not specified for themselves what the consequences of their 
interaction should be.”). 

















Rather, restitution exists alongside—and separate from—tort and contract 
as an “independent basis of liability.”18 In particular, it is the basis upon 
which “a person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject 
to liability.”19 The gist of restitution’s function also can be clarified by 
contrast with the other common-law bases of liability: contract law creates 
individualized duties to perform or forbear as agreed; tort law creates 
common duties to forbear from certain injurious acts; restitution law creates 
common duties to perform certain compensatory acts.20 
Recognized as its own legal discipline in the United States in the late 
nineteenth century,21 restitution’s legal history stretches to seventeenth-
century England,22 and its philosophical history to Ancient Rome.23 A 
robust historical record provides insights into the underpinnings of this body 
of law,24 which has been bolstered by recent efforts to reinvigorate the 
scholarship in this field.25  
Perhaps the most recognizable pillar on which restitution is based is a 
sense of moral justice: Restitution serves to vindicate the common 
perception that “‘natural justice’ dictate[s]” that one should “repay what 
[one] did not deserve to receive.”26 Despite this origin, the field has 
consciously moved towards more determinate rules rather than those based 
on abstract philosophical maxims.27 The doctrine’s applicability is generally 
 
18.   Id. § 1 cmt. a; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1994). 
19.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
20.  See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 67 (1985). 
21.  Louis E. Wolcher, Intent to Charge for Unsolicited Benefits Conferred in an Emergency: A 
Case Study in the Meaning of “Unjust” in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 911, 914 (2011) (identifying the critical point as the publication of WILLIAM 
A. KEENER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893)). 
22.   Daniel Friedmann, Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1879, 
1879 & nn.2-3 (2001).  
23.   Christopher T. Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY 
L.J. 153, 156 (1996). 
24.   See generally Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust 
Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297 (2005). 
25.  See Saiman, supra note 16, at 494 (describing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT as “operat[ing] . . . against . . . the assumption that restitution is little more 
than accumulated bits of discretion garbed as doctrine”). 
26.  Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank One, Waukesha, 881 F.2d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing 
Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 2 Burr. 1005 (Lord Mansfield, C.J.)). 
27.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW 


















limited to redressing the wrongful accrual of “benefits that yield a 
measurable increase in the recipient’s wealth,”28 meaning that courts ought 
not impose restitutionary liability that would “leave the recipient worse off 
(apart from the costs of litigation) than if the transaction giving rise to the 
liability had not occurred.”29 
 
2. Recent Contributions of Law and Economics 
 
Though not as canonical as the fairness rationale, recent decades have 
also seen the development of another pillar for the general principles of 
restitution—the field of law and economics. An influential article by 
Professor Saul Levmore describes restitution as the vehicle by which courts 
address “the question of whether to create bargains where the parties have 
not done so,”30 aiming to strike a balance between society’s baseline 
preference for private bargains and the recognition that these are at times 
impracticable.31 Levmore asserts that “the bulk of everyday nonbargained 
benefit [i.e., restitution] cases . . . are neatly explained” by two theories: 
wealth dependency and market encouragement.32  
The wealth-dependency theory begins by distinguishing between two 
types of transactions: those relating to personal consumption, where 
individuals’ choices differ depending on their wealth and tastes;33 and 
business transactions, where actors evidence a universal desire for anything 
that “can be turned into money.”34 Levmore argues that restitution is 
appropriate only in the latter case (e.g., a mistaken bank transfer), because 
courts can easily assess the value to both parties. Conversely, when a 
benefit’s value is taste-based, as in the case of mistaken home 
improvements, restitution is not appropriate even if a market value can be 
ascertained, because the market value does not account for the recipient’s 
desire—or lack thereof—for the nonbargained benefit.35  
Complementing the wealth-dependency theory, the market-
 
the justification in question is not moral but legal”). 
28.   Id. § 1 cmt. d. 
29.   Id. § 50(3). 
30.   Levmore, supra note 20, at 67. 
31.   Id. at 69. 
32.   Id. at 123. 
33.   Id. at 75. 
34.   Id. at 76. 
35.  Id. at 76-78.  

















encouragement theory posits that restitution operates to support competition 
by preventing intermeddlers from interfering with established contracts.36 
This desire to ward off anticompetitive attempts to foist a bargain on one 
who does not desire it explains why restitution is often denied even in 
financial contexts where the wealth-dependency theory would predict the 
opposite outcome.37 
 
B. The Emergency Exception  
 
Notably, despite the broad coherence of restitution as a body of law,38 
it is only because of an exception to restitution’s general principles that 
liability exists against recipients of nonbargained emergency medical care.39 
Restitution’s broad principles are laid out in Section 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, which declares that “liability 
in restitution may not subject an innocent recipient to a forced exchange.”40 
Conversely, Section 20 states that any provider of “services required for the 
protection of another’s life or health is entitled to restitution from the other 
as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the circumstances justify the 
decision to intervene without request.”41 This exception, which is 
universally adopted,42 is all the more remarkable because it only exists if the 
 
36.   Id. at 79-81. 
37.   Id. at 81. Though newer and more in keeping with the Restatement’s shift toward clear rules, 
Levmore’s theories are sometimes critiqued as incomplete. For example, Bailey Kulin, The Morality of 
Evolutionarily Self-Interested Rescues, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 456-57 (2006), posits that the evolutionary 
psychology of altruism can contribute to a comprehensive explanation as to why some voluntarily 
conferred benefits do not require compensation under restitution doctrine. 
38.  See Michael Traynor, The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Some 
Introductory Suggestions, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899, 899 (2011) (describing the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT as having “brought order to the law of restitution 
and unjust enrichment”). 
39.  Wolcher, supra note 21, at 926 (“Courts granting restitution in such [emergency] cases do so 
as an exception to the usual rule.”). 
40.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(4) (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). This section also notes that “liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily 
conferred” is possible in circumstances where the “intervention in the absence of contract” was 
“justif[ied].” Id. § 2(3). Health care is notable as one of very few situations in which justification is 
presumed. Id.; see also id. §§ 20, 30. Aside from this handful of situations, a finding of justification is 
usually confined to cases where a certain benefit was unrequested but accompanied an intentional 
transaction. See Knope v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 161 A.3d 696, 701 n.3 (Me. 2017); Swanberg v. 
Swanberg, 2016 WL 2908333 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).  
41.  Id. § 20(1).  


















intervenor expects to be remunerated for her efforts, as in the case of 
professional health care providers.43  
Though not always referred to in its modern terminology, doctrines 
resembling the emergency exception have long been applied by courts 
ordering recovery for professional emergency medical care. A well-known 
early example of this phenomenon is Cotnam v. Wisdom,44 an action brought 
by a physician who had rendered care to the unconscious victim of a 
streetcar accident.45 This decision, handed down by the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas in 1907, found decisively for the physician against the injured 
man’s estate, holding that a “person utterly bereft of all sense and reason by 
the sudden stroke of an accident or disease, may be held liable, in assumpsit, 
for necessaries furnished to him in good faith while in that unfortunate and 
helpless condition.”46 The court accepted the defendant’s contention that no 
contract was created but rejected his contention that the law could not create 
an obligation to pay in the absence of a prearranged contract, maintaining 
that, although it was “somewhat awkward,” this obligation in fact existed 
“in the region between contracts on the one hand, and torts on the other . . . 
.”47 In support of the existence of such an obligation, the court analogized 
to the more well-established obligation of guardians to reimburse those who 
provide care to their children.48  
The court further held that liability could not be reduced by virtue of the 
treatment having been unsuccessful, because success “lies with the forces 
of nature . . . [and] the surgeon is not responsible therefor.”49 The court also 
held that any financial difficulties caused by the judgment are inadmissible 
as evidence because “[t]he inquiry was as to the value of the professional 
services” and one’s wealth “could shed no legitimate light upon this 
issue.”50 
 
43.  Id. at 87, 88 n.19. 
44.  104 S.W. 164, 165 (Ark. 1907) (cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 20 Reporter’s Note b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011)). 
45.  Id. at 165. 
46.   Id. (quoting Sceva v. True, 53 N.H. 627 (1873)). 
47.  Id. at 166 (quoting Sceva, 53 N.H. 627 (1873)). 
48.  Id. (citing Lewis v. Lewis, 87 S.W. 134 (Ark. 1905)). This idea, known as the doctrine of 
necessaries arose in the common law to guard against paternal “economic abandonment” at a time when 
families were usually wholly dependent on the father’s financial support. See Karol Williams, Note, The 
Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary Application as a Support Remedy, 19 STETSON L. REV. 661, 
661 (1990).  
49.  Cotnam, 104 S.W. at 166. 
50.  Id. (quoting Morrissett v. Wood, 26 So. 307 (Ala. 1899)). 

















While the longstanding acceptance of the rules established in Cotnam 
and propounded in Restatement § 20 means that these cases are rarely 
litigated today,51 one recent case cited with approval in the Restatement52 is 
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Yale Diagnostic 
Radiology v. Estate of Fountain.53 In Fountain, a physician sued the estate 
of a minor for an unpaid bill of $17,69454 for care rendered after the minor 
was transported to the physician’s hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound 
to the head.55 The physician initiated the proceeding against the minor’s 
estate after the minor’s mother, who was statutorily responsible for the 
minor’s medical bills, obtained a bankruptcy judgment discharging her debt 
to the physician.56 The court found in favor of the physician.57 
As in Cotnam, the court analogized to guardian liability cases.58 After 
noting that restitutionary liability is distinct from contractual liability 
(despite the name “quasi contract”),59 the court declared a rule that 
whenever a minor receives necessary medical care, a contract exists with 
the provider.60 The court further explained that such a contract is implied in 
law based on “no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, 
is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or 
unconscionable.”61 
Two commonalities between Cotnam and Fountain stand out and are 
worth briefly mentioning here. First, they both analogize to the duty of 
parents to pay certain debts if their children are unable to satisfy them.62 In 
 
51.  See David J. Marchitelli, Propriety and Use of Balance Billing in Health Care Context, 69 
A.L.R.6th 317 (2011) (stating that balance billing, a phenomenon described infra Part II.A, which is 
responsible for much of the billing discussed here, is generally presumptively unrestricted, unless “by 
law [or] contract”). 
52.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20 Reporter’s Note b 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
53.  838 A.2d 179 (Conn. 2004). 
54.  For context, it is worth noting that this fee merely represents services performed by the 
plaintiff, who was but one of “a variety of medical services providers” who treated the minor. Id. at 181. 
55.  Id. at 180-81. The court’s opinion refers to this treatment as having been “lifesaving” and does 
not otherwise address the circumstances of the minor’s death. Id. at 181. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 186. 
58.  Id. at 182-83.  
59.  Id. at 183-84 (quoting Bershtein, Bershtein & Bershtein, P.C. v. Nemeth, 603 A.2d 389 (Conn. 
1992)). 
60.  Id. at 184. 
61.  Id. (quoting Bershtein, 603 A.2d 389). 
62.  See supra text accompanying notes 48 and 58. This doctrine began as a requirement that 


















each case, no one other than the patient had such a duty to pay. The reliance 
on the “doctrine of necessaries”—a doctrine of third-party liability for 
others’ contracts—is thus somewhat peculiar in this context. This is 
especially so because that doctrine can only be employed as a result of 
individuals’ intentional choices, such as the choice to engage in a familial 
relationship. Moreover, it is expressly limited by ability to pay. These courts 
therefore seem to have taken part of the rationale for the doctrine of 
necessaries—that doctors deserve to recover money for their potentially 
lifesaving efforts—and transformed it into the whole rationale for 
restitutionary recovery for nonbargained emergency care. 
Further, there is a marked tension between the judicial deference to the 
plaintiffs’ asserted losses in Cotnam and Fountain (neither case placed any 
meaningful limit on the damages requested by the emergency care 
providers) and the Restatement’s insistence that restitutionary awards be 
tied to the gain that accrues to the recipient.63 Not only is this the reverse of 
the way restitution traditionally measures damages, but it too simplistically 
assumes that the value of unsuccessful lifesaving care is sufficiently 
unquantifiable as to necessitate looking to the plaintiff’s costs to arrive at a 
damages figure. Other areas of the law demonstrate that courts can take a 
more active role adjudicating the dollar value of esoteric goods like 
continued life. For example, courts commonly undertake to value the life of 
a victim in wrongful death actions.64 Because only five states permit 
inclusion of the value of life itself in the damages calculus, these awards 
 
times formulate it gender-neutrally and with a focus on paying for necessary goods and services rendered 
to a couple’s children. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 846-48 
(2004).  
63.  Compare Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 166 (Ark. 1907) (basing the measure of damages 
entirely on the “value of the professional services,” to the exclusion of any consideration of the financial 
status of the recipient, or even the outcome of the services) and Fountain, 838 A.2d at 184-86 (affirming 
award of damages without explaining why the amount was reasonable) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 50(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Unjust enrichment from 
unrequested benefits is measured by the standard that yields the smallest liability . . . [which] is normally 
the lesser of market value and a price the recipient has expressed a willingness to pay.”). But see id. § 
20 cmt. c (suggesting that “market value” can be used as a measure of damages when doing so is an easy 
way to solve the “classroom paradox” presented by the fact that “medical treatment . . . [is] difficult to 
value”). For a discussion of the market distortions that make market price a particularly poor indicator 
of the value of medical services in the United States, see infra Section II.A. 
64.  Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 543-44 (2005). 
Wrongful-death statutes became popular in the mid-to-late nineteenth century; Arkansas’s predates the 
Cotnam decision by twenty-two years. James E. Goldie, Comment, The Arkansas Wrongful Death 
Statute, 35 ARK. L. REV. 294, 295 (1981) (finding that Arkansas enacted its first such statute in 1883). 

















vary widely based on factors that can be analyzed without the moral 
murkiness of valuing life per se, such as the decedent’s income, family 
status, and pain and suffering prior to death.65 These sorts of factors could 
inform a proper recipient-focused damages analysis in a restitution case if 
courts were inclined to use them.  
 
II. PATIENTS’ FINANCIAL LIABILITY FOR NONBARGAINED 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE  
 
A. Background on the U.S. Health Care System and Balance Billing 
 
The cases described in Part I make clear that the common law leaves 
emergency patients vulnerable to enormous financial liability for 
nonbargained emergency care. While restitution nowadays generally 
operates in the background, the confounding behemoth of twenty-first 
century American health care perpetuates this liability daily. The health care 
system in the United States is an outlier in many ignominious respects, 
including being the world’s most expensive per capita.66 It is also an outlier 
in its lack of universal health-insurance coverage,67 and its implementation 
instead of a variety of piecemeal payment modalities throughout the health 
care market: some privately funded, others publicly, and others a mix of the 
two.68 Thus, “the American healthcare system stands out not only for its cost 
and inequities but also for its extraordinary complexity.”69  
Medical emergencies exacerbate these inherent costs, iniquities, and 
complexities, especially as related to the payment for such care.70 Though 
emergencies account for only a small fraction of health care spending,71 they 
are ripe for study because they present issues that generally do not arise 
 
65.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 64, at 543-44. 
66.  KAREN DAVIS ET AL., MIRROR MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 7 (The Commonwealth Fund 2014). 
67.  Id. at 8. 
68.  Paul Starr, Law and the Fog of Healthcare: Complexity and Uncertainty in the Struggle Over 
Health Policy, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 213, 214 (2013). 
69.  Id. at 213. 
70.  See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 
127, 130-31 (2017) (“The United States is the only economically developed country where a slip and 
fall and a trip to the emergency room could spell financial ruin . . . insurance coverage does not ensure 
financial protection for patients.”). 
71.  Epstein, supra note 7, at 45; see also U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 


















elsewhere in the system.72 In addition to the important ethical questions such 
cases raise regarding what care should be provided (and how that decision 
should be made),73 an emergency patient’s inability to form a contract for 
the provided services raises difficult questions about how the system should 
operate in the absence of express agreements.74 When a patient receives 
such nonbargained emergency medical care, the law of restitution, 
overlayed by a variety of statutory law, nonetheless imposes an obligation 
to pay in accordance with the relevant regulatory scheme.75  
In recent years, the news media have been replete with stories that 
highlight the unfortunate outcomes of this state of affairs: the emergency 
physician whose patients are furious because they would have preferred less 
care rather than more medical bills;76 the forty-four-year-old triathlete and 
teacher who was temporarily incapacitated by a heart attack and got billed 
$108,951.31 because the hospital to which he happened to be transported 
did not take his insurance;77 the Texas man who received a bill for $7,924 
after he was beaten unconscious on the sidewalk, even though the 
ambulance had serendipitously transported him to a hospital within his 
insurance network.78 Reporting stories about massive hospital bills for care 
that patients did not choose has even become a regular feature of today’s 
health care journalism.79 Yet, few of these cases ever see litigation because 
 
72.  Epstein, supra note 7, at 45. 
73.  See Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REV. 205, 
230-31 (1996). Cost is not considered part of the calculus relating to what care should be provided. Id. 
While this paradigm is beyond the scope of this note, serious concerns regarding financial liability, along 
the lines of those raised in this note, might reasonably lead ethicists to reconsider whether price is truly 
irrelevant in this regard. See generally Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era 
of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1999). 
74.  Epstein, supra note 7, at 10 n.43. 
75.  George A. Nation, Taking Advantage of Patients in an Emergency: Addressing Exorbitant and 
Unexpected Ambulance Bills, 62 VILL. L. REV. 747, 759 (2017).  
76.  Farzon A. Nahvi, Opinion, Don’t Leave Healthcare to a Free Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/opinion/health-insurance-free-market.html 
[https://perma.cc/2P3G-L4YF]. 
77.  Chad Terhune, A Jolt to the Jugular! You’re Insured but Still Owe $109k for your Heart Attack, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 27, 2018), https://khn.org/news/a-jolt-to-the-jugular-youre-insured-but-
still-owe-109k-for-your-heart-attack/ [https://perma.cc/G7AP-K6GU]. 
78.  Sarah Kliff, He Went to an In-Network Emergency Room. He Still Ended up with a $7,924 bill, 
VOX (May 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/23/17353284/emergency-room-doctor-
out-of-network [https://perma.cc/R9R6-RJ7A]. 
79.  Nisarg A. Patel, Journalism Shouldn’t Be a Safeguard Against Unreasonably High Health 
Care Bills, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/10/surprise-billing-
health-care-journalism.html [https://perma.cc/6HF5-HCGK] (identifying at least three national news 

















the validity of the underlying liability is so well established under restitution 
doctrine.80  
Statistics bear out the prevalence of stories like those above. Roughly 
half of all debt sent to collections arises from medical care,81 impacting one 
in every five U.S. credit reports.82 While it is intuitive that individuals 
without medical insurance are most susceptible, the problem does not stop 
there.83 Private insurance pays less than half of the average emergency 
department bill.84 And, despite the relative paucity of it in the overall health 
care market, emergency care leads to more than half of patient-reported 
inability to pay.85 Often, hospitals hold the patients liable for the remaining 
balance after their insurance pays whatever it is willing to, a practice known 
as balance billing, which can have ruinous financial consequences for 
patients.86  
Two burgeoning developments exacerbate the balance-billing problem. 
The first is a recent reversal of the trend toward decreasing numbers of 
uninsured Americans—after the uninsured rate dropped nearly by half from 
2014 to 2016, much of that improvement was wiped out between 2016 and 
2018.87 At the end of 2018, 13.7% of Americans lacked any health 
insurance.88 Secondly, emergency physicians (who often bill separately 
from the hospitals in which they practice) increasingly refrain from joining 
any insurance networks at all,89 perhaps because emergency physicians need 
not build practices on the basis of repeat patients, and thus have less 
 
organizations that regularly perform such reporting and opining that journalism “has turned into 
America’s best defense against surprise health care costs”). 
80.  See Marchitelli, supra note 51. 
81.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS: A STUDY OF MEDICAL AND 
NON-MEDICAL COLLECTIONS 4 (2014). 
82.  Id. at 5.  
83.  HAMEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. 
84.  Jonathan Yun et al., Per Visit Emergency Department Expenditures by Insurance Type, 1996-
2015, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1109, 1111 (2018). 
85.  HAMEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 4. 
86.  Zack Cooper & Fiona Scott Morton, Out-of-Network Emergency Physician Bills—An 
Unwelcome Surprise, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1915, 1917 (2016). 
87.  Dan Witters, U.S. Uninsured Rate Rises to Four-Year High, GALLUP (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/246134/uninsured-rate-rises-four-year-
high.aspx?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_content=morelink&utm_campaign=syndicati
on [https://perma.cc/B548-V79V].  
88.  Id. 


















incentive than other physicians to keep their charges at reasonable levels.90 
A report from the New York State Department of Financial Services 
describes this bluntly, finding that “a relatively small but significant 
number” of physicians “take advantage” of patients’ inability to comparison 
shop or choose in-network care in an emergency.91 
All told, medical bills are the leading cause of bankruptcy in the United 
States, including among individuals who would be considered “middle 
class” or even well-off by many standards.92 Nearly one out of every seven 
households with an annual income above $100,000 faces problems 
satisfying its medical debts.93 Hospitals face a converse problem: of every 
dollar they bill directly to patients, they collect only thirty-three cents.94 
Viewing this phenomenon from another lens, an economic study recently 
found that individuals with low incomes only value their government 
insurance at twenty to forty percent of its cost to the government.95 In short, 
a variety of metrics indicate that there is a large gulf between what hospitals 
like to say their care is worth and what people are actually able and willing 
to pay for it. 
In addition to its well documented costliness, emergency care is notable 
for the way in which small variations can have outsized effects on clinical 
outcomes and financial costs. In an emergency, the presence or absence of 
a simple intervention such as the application of a tourniquet to an injured 
limb before arrival at the hospital can dramatically alter the likelihood of 
complications of stunning financial (not to mention physical) cost, such as 
amputation.96 Simple interventions such as providing appropriate education 
to patients at risk for future incidence of heart failure can often cost far less 
 
90.  Zack Cooper et al., Surprise! Out-of-Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United States 
3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23623, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23623.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TGP-HP27]. 
91.  BENJAMIN LAWSKY, AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE: HOW NEW YORKERS ARE GETTING STUCK 
WITH UNEXPECTED MEDICAL BILLS FROM OUT-OF-NETWORK PROVIDERS 3 (N.Y. State Dept. of 
Financial Services, 2012), http://www.statecoverage.org/files/NY-Unexpected_Medical_Bills-
march_7_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB4A-XNLV]. 
92.  Epstein, supra note 7, at 36. 
93.  HAMEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 2. 
94.  Epstein, supra note 7, at 37. 
95.  Amy Finkelstein et al., The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting Results from the Oregon Health 
Insurance Experiment 33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21308, 2015). 
96.  Alison A. Smith et al., Prehospital Tourniquet Use in Penetrating Extremity Trauma: 
Decreased Blood Transfusions and Limb Complications, 86 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE SURGERY 43, 
46–47 (2018). 

















than the future emergency care that such clinical forethought can help 
prevent.97  
B. Relevant Federal-Law Framework 
 
Many of the problems related to the present system of patient liability 
for emergency care arise alongside a thicket of federal legislation. The 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act98 (EMTALA) 
mandates that any hospital emergency department that participates in 
Medicare must provide assessment and stabilization for any patient who 
presents to its emergency department.99 Hospitals are subject to a $50,000 
penalty for each violation,100 in addition to being liable to any patients 
harmed by a hospital’s failure to treat in compliance with EMTALA.101 This 
statute aimed to remedy what Congress viewed as a shortcoming in state 
tort law, whereby no liability existed for failing to provide emergency 
care.102 Congress intended to ensure that “each patient, regardless of 
perceived ability or inability to pay, is treated in a uniform manner in 
accordance with the existing procedures.”103 Yet, despite this intent to cabin 
a hospital’s use of pre-treatment knowledge of a patient’s financial status, 
EMTALA establishes no independent duty to avoid making such 
inquiries.104 
An early 2000s Pennsylvania case, Temple University Hospital v. 
Healthcare Management Alternatives, Inc.,105 sits at the intersection of 
EMTALA, insurance, and emergency care. The suit arose after Temple 
declined to extend a contract with HMA whereby Temple provided care to 
enrollees of HMA’s managed-care program; when HMA patients continued 
to seek emergency care at Temple following the contract’s expiration, 
Temple remained legally bound to treat them in accordance with EMTALA. 
 
97.  Vishwaratn Asthana et al., Heart Failure Education in the Emergency Department Markedly 
Reduces Readmissions in Un- and Under-Insured Patients, 36 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 2166, 2169-70 
(2018). 
98.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2018). 
99.  Id. §§ (a)-(b). 
100.  Id. § (d)(1). 
101.  Id. § (d)(2). 
102.  Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001). 
103.  Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2001). 
104.  Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d. 752, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that such inquiries are 
only prohibited if they would also run afoul of EMTALA’s prohibition on delaying care). 


















Temple then sought payment from HMA at the previously contracted 
rates.106 HMA paid only a portion of these bills,107 alleging that the full 
charges were “commercially unreasonable.”108  
The court recognized the lack of choice that is inherent when patients 
seek emergency care.109 The court quickly dispensed of HMA’s claim that 
no unjust enrichment occurred at all, and moved onto the thornier question 
of whether the trial court correctly measured HMA’s liability.110 It held that 
the trial court had fixed liability too high by basing it solely on Temple’s 
published price list, which the trial court deemed “unreasonable” but not 
unconscionable.111 The court held that this approach “ignore[d] the equities 
in this case, as well as the realities of the current state of the health care 
industry,” and therefore fixed liability lower than Temple’s published price 
list would have indicated.112  
The Temple case is fairly typical of courts’ comfort with hospitals’ 
requests to hold defendants liable for emergency care. It indicates that this 
is true even where everyone agrees that no contract existed, and even where 
courts are not entirely comfortable with health care providers’ desired 
reimbursement rates. Yet, this picture would be quite different if the insurer 
were the federal government itself. Federal law provides strong balance- 
billing protections for enrollees of both Medicare113 and Medicaid.114 In 
addition to indicating the desirability of such a setup (given that the federal 
government uniquely acts as both insurer and insurance rule-maker), these 
 
106.  Id. at 505. On a prior appeal in the same case, the court had determined that no implied contract 
existed between the parties after the expiration of the contract they had explicitly negotiated. Id. 
107.   Id. 
108.  Id. at 506. 
109.  Id. at 507. 
110.  Id. at 507-08. 
111.  Id. at 508. 
112.  Id. Of course, this sort of pro-debtor ruling that liability is less than the care-provider asserts 
will be of little comfort to those who lack the resources necessary to pursue litigation in the first place—
a category that likely includes most American households facing crushing medical debt.  
113.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4(g)(1)(A) (2018). Because this provision was amended as part of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), it may be affected by ongoing 
litigation that seeks to hold the entire ACA unconstitutional. See Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 
3d 665 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (holding entire ACA unconstitutional), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 945 
F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) 
(Nos. 19-840, 19-1019). The case was argued at the Supreme Court in November 2020. Session 
Beginning November 2, 2020, SUP. CT. U.S. (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNovember2020.html 
[https://perma.cc/73RW-72AV].   
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provisions exemplify a straightforward form of liability minimization quite 
unlike the convoluted protections for private-insurance customers described 
in the following section. For example, in contrast to those more complex 
schemes, the Medicaid balance billing prohibition provides simply that 
physicians who accept Medicaid must accept it as “payment in full,” subject 
only to the patient’s prior commitment with the Medicaid program for 
payment of a deductible or copay. 
A further complexity is introduced at the federal level by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, better known as ERISA.115 Under 
ERISA, states are expressly preempted from directly regulating “employee 
benefit plans.”116 Moreover, the preemptive effect of this provision is 
interpreted broadly to preempt even state legislation whose effect on such 
plans would be rather attenuated.117 This requires states to be careful about 
how their legislation is framed in this arena.118 
 
C. Attempted Legislative Solutions 
 
The problems posed by costs of emergency care have recently garnered 
political attention.119 Economic analysis makes a strong case for the need 
for legislative intervention by showing that, in the current environment, 
emergency physicians “need not set their prices in response to market forces 
. . . [which] exposes patients to significant financial risk, and reduces social 
welfare.”120 
Several states have passed legislation protecting patients from at least 
some subset of balance billing. Nevertheless, these laws frequently fail to 
sufficiently ameliorate exposure to financial risk.121 A common approach is 
typified by Louisiana, where health care providers are prohibited from 
balance billing enrollees of an insurance plan with which the provider has 
an agreement, except to the extent of the patient’s prearranged copayment 
 
115.  See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001).  
116.  29 § U.S.C. 1144(a) (2018). 
117.  Fuse Brown, supra note 70, at 184.  
118.  Id. at 184-85. 
119.  Id. at 147-49. 
120.  Cooper et al., supra note 90, at 2. 
121.  Fuse Brown, supra note 70, at 147-48. For a comprehensive review of legislative proposals to 
curtail balance billing both within and beyond the emergency context, see Merlow M. Dunham, 
Comment, Avoiding Sticker Shock: Legislative Approaches to Protect Consumers from Surprise Medical 


















or deductible.122 An analogous provision of the federal Affordable Care Act 
prohibits insurers from leaving their enrollees liable for out-of-network 
emergency care costs except to the extent they would be liable for the same 
care in-network.123 By their terms, such protections are only availing to 
patients who both have insurance and are lucky enough to seek care from a 
provider who contracts with their insurance plan (also known as being “in 
network”). Moreover, even in situations where they are applicable, these 
protections are often countermanded by high deductibles and other market 
complexities that undermine the goal of this legislation.124 
Recently, some states have begun to go further towards liability 
protection for recipients of nonbargained emergency care. In Massachusetts, 
an insurer whose enrollee receives emergency care at an out-of-network 
hospital is responsible for paying “at the same level and in the same manner” 
as if the patient had received the care in-network.125 Since enacting its new 
law on the subject126 in 2015, New York’s approach has been described as 
providing the most robust financial protections for recipients of such 
emergency care.127 Many of its provisions, such as price-disclosure 
requirements,128 do not have particular salience in the emergency context. 
New York’s signature provision for recipients of emergency care is similar 
to that found in Massachusetts, in that it protects insured patients from 
paying bills greater than their in-network “copay, coinsurance, or 
deductible” regardless of whether the emergency providers were in 
network.129   
New York goes beyond the Massachusetts legislation through increased 
regulation of the insurer-provider dynamic related to settlement of out-of-
network emergency bills. Rather than mandating a specific level of 
payment, as Massachusetts does, New York allows an insurer to pay “an 
amount it deems reasonable for the emergency services rendered by the non-
participating physician,” and creates a framework for physician-insurer 
 
122.  LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1874(A) (Westlaw, through 2018 Third Extraordinary Session). 
123.  42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-19a(b) (2018). Like the provisions discussed above, this provision is in 
limbo as a result of the ongoing Texas litigation. 
124.  See Fuse Brown, supra note 70, at 141-42. 
125.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176I, § 3(b) (West, Westlaw through ch. 276 of 2018 2d annual 
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126.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.5 (2018).  
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128.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.5(f) (2018). 
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negotiations on this front along prescribed timelines.130 A state-run 
arbitration process exists to resolve such negotiations if the parties are 
unable to do so on their own.131 
A variety of federal proposals have arisen recently as well. In October 
2018, Senators Maggie Hassan and Jeanne Shaheen introduced the No More 
Surprise Medical Bills Act of 2018.132 Like the state enactments discussed 
above, this bill would prohibit providers from charging out-of-network 
emergency patients more than those patients would have paid for the same 
services in-network.133 It would additionally set up a binding dispute 
resolution mechanism akin to the one that exists in New York.134 No action 
was taken on the bill prior to the end of the legislative session.135 
Lastly, nongovernmental organizations have proposed other legislative 
solutions as well. In 2015, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners proposed the Health Benefit Plan Network Access and 
Adequacy Model Act. While many of its provisions mirror those that exist 
in the New York and Massachusetts laws, it is notable for also proposing an 
affirmative duty for hospitals to notify patients that they may not be liable 
for the full extent of a balance bill.136 
 
III.  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
While it may seem surprising to combine Part I’s analysis of old-
fashioned common law with Part II’s discussion of modern regulatory and 
insurance frameworks, this approach helps to elucidate the full picture of 
the modern emergency billing crisis, beginning with its root causes. One 
upshot of this discussion is that, at least in the context of nonbargained 
emergency care, many critiques of health care billing often in some measure 
miss the forest for the trees. Certainly, the complex frameworks under 
which hospital rates are established and billed contribute to the scourge of 
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https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3592 [https://perma.cc/NK6B-AJQ7].  
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emergency balance billing.137 Yet, tinkering with these will often amount to 
little more than moderate changes at the margins, when what is really 
needed is the sort of fundamental rethinking that entails a reevaluation of 
the underlying, deceptively impactful, common-law rules. 
The success with which hospitals bill emergency patients for exorbitant 
sums largely arises from health care providers running roughshod over 
courts’ belief that restitution doctrine leaves them little room to question the 
bills that such providers issue to emergency patients.138 Before I discuss 
practical legislative solutions to this conundrum, it is worth noting that 
courts may actually be mistaken in this belief. The emergency exception is 
generally justified on a public-interest theory wherein society benefits from 
the provision of emergency health services in a way that is categorially 
different from other sorts of nonbargained benefits.139 Like many common-
law rules, this undoubtedly made sense in a time long before the modern 
welfare state and health care regulation more broadly. Now, however, 
EMTALA prescribes hefty penalties for hospitals who refuse unpaying 
patients; probably due to some combination of this law and evolving public 
perceptions of health care as a public service rather than purely for-profit 
enterprise, hospitals like Temple comply despite substantial uncertainty that 
they will actually be paid for emergency services rendered.140  
Moreover, this judicial approach relies on assumptions that are 
questionable at best. These include that the services are easy enough to value 
or represent significant opportunity costs for the physicians providing them, 
thereby justifying the imposition of liability on unsuspecting patients where 
it would otherwise seem impractical or inequitable.141 By focusing on the 
plaintiff’s costs rather than the defendant’s benefits, and by failing to 
consider the success or failure of the medical treatment in these cases,142 
restitution’s response to emergencies  is an outlier from the rest of the 
doctrine.143  
The pitfalls of this approach go all the way back to the early cases of 
 
137.  See Fuse Brown, supra note 70, at 130. 
138.  See, e.g., Yale Diagnostic Radiology v. Estate of Fountain, 838 A.2d 179, 184 (Conn. 2004). 
139.  Albert, supra note 5, at 100. 
140.  See Temple Univ. Hosp. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, 832 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
141.  Albert, supra note 5, at 100-01. 
142.  Wonnell, supra note 23, at 171 (“Physicians are one of the only rescue groups who are awarded 
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143.  See Kull, supra note 14, at 1201, 1201 n.27 (1995) (“[T]he ordinary measure of recovery is . . 
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restitutionary liability for emergency care like Cotnam v. Wisdom.144 While 
Cotnam may seem far removed from modern health care billing in both time 
and simplicity, the legal principles it (and its sister cases in jurisdictions 
throughout the United States) announced should not go overlooked as 
essential components underlying the present morass. This is especially true 
with respect to the measure of liability. In 1907, it may have been a 
straightforward matter to take a physician’s word as to the value of his 
services; in 2019, such a judicial approach leaves patients at the mercy of 
complex corporations that face a variety of inflationary incentives.145  
Whatever the merits of a more active judicial role in these cases, it is no 
doubt unlikely that such a sea change would occur anytime soon (or that 
patients would even bring the necessary lawsuits in the first place). The 
problem must therefore be addressed legislatively. In doing so, however, 
state legislators can learn from the pitfalls of their judicial colleagues’ 
overreliance on old assumptions about liability in emergencies. In other 
words, states should go beyond the examples of New York and 
Massachusetts, which continue to endorse an overbroad role for insurers by 
tying a patient’s balance billing immunity to her insurance coverage. 
Instead, a true solution to the emergency balance billing crisis must lie in a 
reexamination of the scope of the emergency exception in restitution 
doctrine. Given all the uncertainties of emergency health care—whether one 
will need it at all, whether it will be effective, whether it will be at an in-
network facility, whether the treating physicians will strive for cost-
effectiveness—states should simply recognize that in the small subset of 
cases of true nonbargained emergency care,146 patient financial liability 
under the doctrine of restitution no longer represents the reliably beneficial 
societal trade-off it once did.   
This solution may sound radical, but given the relatively minor share 
that emergencies constitute in most hospitals’ revenue streams, it will have 
a much stronger positive impact on a few unlucky individuals than a 
negative impact on hospital balance sheets. Balance billing in the 
emergency context is therefore just the kind of problem ripe for a radical 
rethinking: the burden of subsidizing this significant benefit for a few can 
be spread widely throughout the health care system. Such an approach 
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would have several advantages over current policy. In addition to 
vindicating the animating principles of restitution—including fairness, 
efficiency, and damages calculated based on gain rather than loss—such a 
solution would also ensure that the federal regulatory framework around 
emergency medical care functions as it is intended. In particular, while the 
statutory text of EMTALA does not address matters of patient liability, its 
purpose of equalizing treatment across the socioeconomic spectrum is 
plainly not accomplished in the modern reality where any medical 
emergency can quickly become a game of financial roulette.147 This solution 
would also obviate the preemption problems posed by ERISA, because it 
operates directly on the patient-provider relationship; it would not change 
the functioning of insurance, only carve out a small subset of health care for 
which insurance would become unnecessary.  
Finally, it is worth nothing that though this note makes 
recommendations with the goal of easing the burden faced by recipients of 
emergency medical care, these recommendations would not be entirely 
adverse to providers of that care. Hospitals face significant challenges in 
collecting on bills they send directly to patients (as opposed to those sent to 
their insurers).148 The increased predictability of reimbursement would 
likely offset some of the potential revenue loss entailed. 
Even under the reasonable assumption that this proposal would result in 
net costs to most hospitals that operate emergency rooms, it is preferable to 
the current situation. Hospitals already argue that low reimbursement rates 
for emergency care justify price increases for non-emergency care.149 By 
eliminating hospitals’ ability to have their cake and eat it too—by issuing 
massive bills to emergency patients while telling non-emergency patients 
they need to subsidize the non-payment of these bills—states can take 
another step towards making the healthcare market a more transparent one. 
It is quite likely that hospitals would increase prices for the large majority 
of care that, at least nominally, does result from a bargaining process. 
Patients would at least be able to evaluate these prices knowing that the 
hospital will not later be able to bill them heavily for the very care that 
hospitals seek to subsidize with higher prices elsewhere.  
 
147.  See Fuse Brown, supra note 70, at 130-31. 
148.  Epstein, supra note 7, at 37. 
149.  See id. 



















The American health care system is a complex animal. Its myriad 
intricacies can be evaluated from a variety of viewpoints. While none is 
likely to lead to a complete solution to any issue, each has its own unique 
way of helping to chart a way forward. Going back to first principles, while 
certainly counterintuitive in a system so heavy with recent and voluminous 
legislation, can help us see that these hidden rules have in some cases come 
to be out of step with the goals and principles that first gave rise to them 
centuries ago.  
While many solutions in health care will need to be novel, in the context 
of patient liability for emergency medical bills, the true problem is that in 
modern times the old rules no longer effectuate our sense of fairness as they 
once did. Now that we have laws like EMTALA and complex billing 
schemes where hospitals overcharge in one area to subsidize non-payment 
in another area, we no longer need to worry about the doctor who might not 
get paid for helping an emergency patient, but about the doctor, like Naveed 
Khan, who may see his savings wiped out because of a freak accident. In 
this narrow subset of health care—true emergencies—looking backward 
can help show us the way forward. 
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